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THE ROLE AND FUTURE OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUNDS: A TRADE AND INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVE
Locknie Hsu*
INTRODUCTION
Sovereign wealth funds ("SWFs") have been greeted with both
enthusiasm and suspicion. In one respect, they have been called
"white knights," where they step in to inject financing to troubled
entities.' In others, they have been called "Trojan horses" and
"chameleons."2
The prospect of having a friendly foreign government-owned
entity invest in one's businesses is a natural extension of the notion
of "state capitalism"-after all, governments all over the world need
to invest reserves and other legitimate revenues in order to raise
reasonable returns for their citizens. The suspicion arises when a
recipient country's government views a foreign government's
investment as raising sensitive issues, such as national security, and
when the investment consists of acquiring control of critical state
infrastructure or technology. Nationalist sentiments can also play a
role in recipient countries, contributing to public outcry at particular
investments. Finally, SWF investors, through their articulated
investment policies, may also embrace certain sociopolitical objectives
as they make their economic investment decisions.
Due to their government ownership, SWFs also fall into the group
of business entities known as state-owned enterprises ("SOEs"),
although SWFs' missions are typically different from SOEs, which
engage primarily in commercial dealing in goods and services. 3
In a previous work, 4 this author had suggested that SWFs are
creatures in search of a legal identity. 5 This remains the case today,
* Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University and
Advocate & Solicitor, Singapore; the author may be reached by email at
lockniehsu@smu.edu.sg.
1. See Locknie Hsu, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Investors in Search of an
Identity in the Twenty-First Century, 2015 INT'L REV. L. 1, 3 n.15 (2015).
2. Larry CatA Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory Chameleons:
The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Global Governance Through
Private Global Investment, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 425, 435-36 (2010); Hsu, supra note
1, at 1 n.4, 3 n.15.
3. Hsu, supra note 1, at 1, 3.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 3.
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particularly in the context of existing and emerging investment
agreements and national investment approval regulations. This
Article examines SWF developments through the lens of trade and
investment law, as a contribution to the international discussion on
the legal (and other) status of SWFs.
I. EVOLVING ROLE OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
This Article discusses the emerging roles of SWFs after the 2008
financial crisis. Additionally, this Article suggests that there has
been a confluence of four main developments: (1) the highly visible
role during the financial crisis of SWFs as "shareholders of last resort"
in bailouts of large financial institutions; (2) the sociopolitical
dimensions attached to increasing and aggressive investments made
by SWFs from economies which are not traditionally capitalist; (3) the
responses in national laws and regulations governing admission and
divestment requirements applied to SWFs; and (4) the increasing
number of investment treaties-including free trade agreements that
contain investment obligations-that broadly define who is an
"investor" that might be able to benefit from the spectrum of legal
benefits in such agreements, from quality of treatment to access to
international arbitration dispute mechanisms in case of disputes.
SWFs are hybrid in the sense that they are (often) owned by
states but carry out commercial investment decisions.
6 State funds
are used in investments while seeking returns, such as those which a
nonstate commercial entity might seek.7 To add to these complex
characteristics, even among SWFs, one size does not fit all.
8 The
Santiago Principles define SWFs as follows:
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are special purpose investment
funds or arrangements, owned by the general government.
Created by the general government for macroeconomic
purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve
financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies
which include investing in foreign financial assets. The SWFs
6. Id.
7. The notion of "state capitalism" has been associated with government
activities in pursuit of commercial objectives. See, e.g., Joel Slawotsky, Incipient
Activism of Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Need to Update United States
Securities Laws, 2015 INT'L REV. L. 1, 9 (2015).
8. In 2008, the European Union ("EU") published a paper in an effort to
contribute to a common standing on SWFs within the Union, including treatment
of SWFs as investors. See COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, A COMMON
EUROPEAN APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS (2008), http://ec.europa.eu
/internal market/finances/docs/sovereign-en.pdf. See generally Heike
Schweitzer, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Market Investors or "Imperialist
Capitalists?" The European Response to Direct Investment by Non-EU State-
Controlled Entitles, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
2011, at 79 (Christoph Hermann & J6rg Philipp Terhecthe eds., 2011).
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are commonly established out of balance of payments surpluses,
official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of
privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from
commodity exports. 9
These principles aimed to inject a degree of transparency into the
governance and activities of participating SWFs.10 As one learned
author has aptly summarized:
SWFs, as hybrid actors consisting of both private market as well
as government actor elements, are under particularly strict
scrutiny. The opacity of SWFs has been a key focus of Western
critics, who fear politically-driven investment decisions.
Controversies and mistrust arise from conflicting purposes of
state capitalism and market capitalism.11
The International Forum on Sovereign Wealth Funds ("IFSWF')
was formed in 2008 and its major contribution has been to crystallize
a set of guiding principles for SWFs, known as the Santiago
Principles.1 2 The Santiago Principles provide a "soft law" governance
structure through twenty-four guiding principles to the participating
SWFs. 13 Endorsement of these Principles is on a voluntary basis.
Examples of implementation have been discussed as case studies to
promote greater understanding. 14
Since the launch of the Santiago Principles, new SWF players
(such as those in India, Indonesia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia) have
been emerging, but it would appear that these newcomers have not
yet been inducted into the hall of participants of the Principles. 15
9. INT'L WORKING GRP. OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUNDS: GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES: "SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES"
3 n.7 (2008) [hereinafter SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES], http://www.ifswf.org/sites
/default/files/santiagoprinciplesoo.pdf.
10. Id. at 4-5.
11. Slawotsky, supra note 7, at 9. See generally Yvonne C.L. Lee, The
Governance of Contemporary Sovereign Wealth Funds, 6 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 197
(2010).
12. SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 1.
13. See id. at 7-9.
14. See generally INT'L FORUM OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SANTIAGO
PRINCIPLES: 15 CASE STUDIES (2014), http://www.ifswf.org/santiago-principles
-landing/15-case-studies; Edwin M. Truman, Implementation of the Santiago
Principles for Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Progress Report (Peterson Inst. for Int'l
Econ, Policy Brief No. 13-31, 2013), https://piie.com/sites/default/files
/publications/pb/pb13-31.pdf.
15. See Our Members, INT'L F. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS,
http://www.ifswf.org/our-members (last visited Nov. 9, 2017).
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II. LEGAL TREATMENT OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
One can discern a number of methods of treatment, in law and
soft law, of SWFs, usually through the lens of distinct regulatory or
administrative agencies. 16 These include the following:
* Governance initiatives (examples include the Santiago
Principles and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development's Guidelines on Corporate Governance of
State-Owned Enterprises);
* National investment laws with national security dimensions
(examples can be found in the investment screening laws of
Australia, Canada, the EU, and the United States); 17
* Investment treaties and free-trade agreements ("FTAs") that
include investor protection guarantees;
* Tax treatment of SWFs; 18
* Applicability of jurisdictional immunity principles to SWFs;
" Securities laws;
* Competition laws; and
" Currency valuations. 19
It is beyond the scope of the present Article to examine all of these
areas; many of these are well discussed in other, existing works. The
focus of this Article will instead be on recent developments in
investment treaty commitments, dispute settlements, and the-
perhaps growing-expectations placed on SWFs with regard to social
responsibility agendas.
16. See Slawotsky, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
17. See Locknie Hsu, Multi-Sourced Norms Affecting Sovereign Wealth
Funds: A Comparative View of National Laws, Cross-Border Treaties and Non-
Binding 'Codes', 10 J. WORLD INv. & TRADE 793, 819 (2009); Schweitzer, supra
note 8, at 97-101. See generally Locknie Hsu, SWFs, Recent US Legislative
Changes, and Treaty Obligations, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 451 (2009); Freedom of
Investment at the OECD, ORGANISATION FOR EcON. CO-OPERATION & DEv.,
http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/foi.htm (last visited Nov. 9,
2017) (providing documentation on investment treaties and national security).
18. International Tax, INLAND REVENUE AUTHORITY SING.,
https://www.iras.gov.sg/irashome/quick-links/international-tax/ (last updated
Aug. 15, 2017) (showing that tax exemptions for certain SWF activity can be
found in some taxation treaties, such as the avoidance of double taxation treaties
signed by Singapore with China, India, Israel, and Malaysia).
19. See, e.g., Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian, Currency
Undervaluation and Sovereign Wealth Funds: A New Role for the World Trade
Organization (Peterson Inst. of Int'l Econ., Working Paper No. 08-2, 2008),
https://piie.com/publications/working-papers/currency-undervaluation-and
-sovereign-wealth-funds-new-role-world-trade.
[Vol. 52840
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III. STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND MULTILATERAL TRADE
REGULATIONS
In international trade, a number of treaty obligations apply
specifically to SOEs.20  For example, under the World Trade
Organization's multilateral agreements, SOEs' trade activities are
subject to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"),
particularly article XVII.21 FTAs often also include provisions
specifically applicable to trade activities of SOEs. 22
SOEs may also come under the coverage of bilateral investment
treaties ("BITs"), as well as FTAs, in different ways. 23 For instance,
they are often included in the procompetition provisions of FTAs.24
Such provisions usually aim to ensure that SOEs-particularly those
that might be monopoly suppliers of goods and services-are subject
to the procompetition obligations of the treaty.25
SOEs may also be covered under the investment guarantee
provisions of BITs and FTAs, due to usually broad definitions of
"investor" and "investment."26 Insofar as such provisions include
SWFs by the treaty's definitions (for instance those for "SOEs" or
"investors"), treaty guarantees-such as minimum level of treatment
and access to international investor-state dispute mechanisms like
arbitration-would also be available to SWFs.27 This means that
SWFs that invest in host/recipient states that have signed such
treaties with the SWFs' home states will enjoy such protection and
will be potential claimants under such treaties.
A. Sovereign Wealth Funds as Investors and Potential Claimants
under Treaties
An increasing number of treaties permit entities owned or
controlled by states to be included as investors qualifying for benefits
under them, and this may portend more disputes activity by and
relating to SWFs in the near future. For example, the U.S.-Singapore
Free Trade Agreement ("USSFTA"), in force since January 2004,
excludes Singapore's SWFs as "covered enterprises," but chapter 15
20. See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
21. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XVII, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-52, 55 U.N.T.S. 250 (text of the full GATT 1994 is available at
https://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/legal-e.htm).
22. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1503, Can-Mex.
-U.S., opened for signature Dec. 8, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
23. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 22.
25. See, e.g., United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement art. 12.1, Sing.-
U.S., May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 [hereinafter USSFTA].
26. Yuri Shima, The Policy Landscape for International Investment by
Government-Controlled Investors 12 (Organisation for Econ. Co-operation & Dev.,
Working Paper No. 2015/01, 2015).
27. See, e.g., id.
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includes them as "investors" for purposes of protection and claims
against the United States as host/recipient state. 28
The following is an example of recent investment treaty language
from the China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement (in
force from May 17, 2014):
The term "enterprise of a Contracting Party" means any legal
person or any other entity constituted or organized under the
applicable laws and regulations of that Contracting Party,
whether or not for profit, and whether private-or government-
owned or controlled, and includes a company, corporation, trust,
partnership, sole proprietorship, joint venture, association or
organization . . .29
SWFs that invest in countries with whom their home states have
bilateral or regional investment treaties may encounter the need to
seek redress thereunder in a number of situations. While SWFs have
not shied away from dispute settlement in the international arena,
there had been relatively few cases involving such entities until
recently.30
B. Approval of Investments
The first aspect of scrutiny relates to the admission and approval
phase of an investor.31  This includes the granting of initial
permissions to undertake the investment activity in question, such as
the purchase of a domestic entity or of a controlling stake in such an
entity and screening procedures of existing investments leading to
mandatory divestment. 32 An example of the latter type of case can be
seen in Ralls v. CFIUS.33 While Ralls involved a Chinese-owned
28. USSFTA, supra note 25, at ch. 15.
29. Agreement Among the Government of Japan, the Government of the
Republic of Korea, and the Government of the People's Republic of China for the
Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of Investment, May 13, 2012,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/5/pdfs/0513_01Ol1.pdf.
30. See, e.g., Claudia Annacker, Protection and Admission of Sovereign
Investment Under Investment Treaties, 10 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 531, 550-61 (2011).
31. See Annacker, supra note 30; Mark Feldman, The Standing of State-
Owned Entities Under Investment Treaties, in YEARBOOK ON INT'L INV. LAw &
POLIcY 2010-2011, at 615 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2012); Grant Hanessian & Kabir
Duggal, The Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds and National Oil Companies in
Investment Arbitrations, GLOBAL ARB. REv. (June 5, 2017),
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/chapter/1142582/the-role-of-sovereign-wealth
-funds-and-national-oil-companies-in-investment-arbitrations.
32. See Annacker, supra note 30 at 544-46; Feldman, supra note 31.
33. 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The case was subsequently settled. See
Judy Wang, Ralls Corp. v. CFIUS: A New Look at Foreign Direct Investments to
the US, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. BULL. 30 (2016); Stephen Dockery, Chinese
Wind Company Settles with U.S. in CFIUS Battle, WALL ST. J.: RISK COMPLIANCE
J. (Oct. 9, 2015), https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/10/09/chinese
-wind-company-settles-with-u-s-in-cfius-battle/. See generally Christopher M.
[Vol. 52842
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investor, which was neither a SOE nor a SWF, and was ultimately
settled, the action is noteworthy as an illustration of an investor
actively challenging an investment-screening decision by the U.S.
authorities. 34
Other recent examples of scrutiny of foreign acquisitions under
national investment laws have seen the intervention by the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States ("CFIUS") in
attempts at acquisitions of European entities by Chinese-owned
private entities. The first example relates to the acquisition of
interests in Aixtron, a German entity, by Fujian Grand Chip
Investment Fund, a Chinese entity.35 The acquisition of the U.S.
business of Aixtron was initially blocked by then-President Obama's
administration.36 The U.S. Treasury Department stated, inter alia,
that "CFIUS and the President assess that the transaction poses a
risk to the national security of the United States that cannot be
resolved through mitigation" and ordered full and permanent
abandonment of the acquisition. 37
In July 2016, a consortium led by a Chinese entity, M.L.S.
Electronics, planned to acquire Ledvance, a division of German
lighting manufacturer Osram. 38 In October 2016, the German
government blocked the acquisition, expressing a lack of reciprocity
by China, arguing that, while China was protecting its own
companies from foreign takeovers, "China itself is going on a shopping
tour [in Germany] with a long list of interesting companies[-]with
the clear intention of acquiring strategically important key
Fitzpatrick, Where Ralls Went Wrong: CFIUS, the Courts, and the Balance of
Liberty and Security, 101 CORNELL L. REv. 1087 (2016) (explaining the history of
the dispute).
34. See Slawotsky, supra note 7, at 7-8.
35. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Statement on the
President's Decision Regarding the U.S. Business of Aixtron SE (Dec. 2, 2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/l0679.aspx.
36. Id.; see also Matthias Inverardi & Diane Bartz, Obama Bars China's
Fujian from Buying Aixtron's U.S. Business, REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-aixtron-m-a-fujian-idUSKBN13RODU;
William Mauldin, Obama Blocks Chinese Bid for Technology Firm Aixtron, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-blocks-chinese-bid-for
-technology-firm-aixtron- 1480716287.
37. Press Release, supra note 35.
38. UPDATE 1-Osram Sells Lamps Unit to Chinese Buyers for More than 400
Mln Euros, REUTERS (July 26, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/osram-licht
-ma-china-idUSL8N1AC5WV.
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technologies." 39 The acquisition was finally approved and completed
in early 2017.40
A third example is seen in the blocking by CFIUS of the sale of
Philips' LumiLEDs unit to GO Scale Capital, a Chinese private equity
fund.41 LumiLEDs was subsequently sold to a U.S. investor instead.42
In the United Kingdom, there was an initial delay in approval to build
a nuclear power station by two foreign parties-Electricit6 de France
SA and China General Nuclear. The plan was subsequently approved
by Prime Minister Theresa May's government. 43 In September 2016,
the Prime Minister indicated that there would be stricter scrutiny of
"critical infrastructure" mergers and acquisitions. 44
Examples of scrutiny of state-enterprise-related investment bids
under Australia's investment laws include the 2016 review of and
decision to reject the bids by State Grid Corporation of China and
Hong Kong-based Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings Ltd. for a
ninety-nine-year lease of 50.4% of AusGrid, the electricity
distribution network in New South Wales. 45 The reason given was
39. Michael Nienaber, German Minister Ups Rhetoric Against Takeovers
Ahead of China Trip, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us
-germany-china-m-a-idUSKCN12T0FS; see BUNDESMINISTERIUM FOR
WIRTSCHAFT UND ENERGIE, PROPOSALS FOR ENSURING AN IMPROvED LEVEL PLAYING
FIELD IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT (Feb. 2017), https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion
/DE/Downloads/E/eckpunktepapier-proposals-for-ensuring-an-improved-level
-playing-field-in-trade-and-investment.pdf?_blob=publicationFile&v-- 4 ;
Germany Stalls Osram Unit Sale to Chinese Buyers: WirtschaftsWoche, REUTERS
(Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.reuters.comlarticle/us-osram-licht-m-a
-idUSKCN12R1PW.
40. Osram Says Gets German Government Approval for Lamps Sale,
REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/osram-licht-lamps
-idUSL5N1FK3SN.
41. John Murray Brown & Duncan Robinson, Philips Lighting Unit Sale to
Chinese Group Collapses on US Concern, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/336eef0-cOf4-11e5-9fdb-87b8dl5baec2.
42. See Philips to Sell Lumileds to U.S. Investor Apollo for $1.5 Billion,
REUTERS (Dec. 12, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philips-m-a-lumileds
-idUSKBN1410IJ.
43. Francois De Beaupry, UK Approves EDF's £18 Billion Hinkley Point
Nuclear Project, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2016-09-14/u-k-said-to-approve-edf-s-18-billion-pound-nuclear-project
-it39ityn; Graham Ruddick, China Plans Central Role in UK Nuclear Industry
After Hinkley Point Approval, GUARDIAN (Sept. 15, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/sep/15/hinkley-point-chinese-firm
-to-submit-essex-nuclear-plant-plans.
44. Jim Pickard et al., Hinkley Point Deal Prompts Tougher Line on
Infrastructure Sales, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content
/8a2191fa-7b5a-11e6-ae24-f193b105145e.
45. Perry Williams, Australia Blocks Bids for Ausgrid, Triggering Warning
from China, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2016-08-19/australia-bars-foreign-investors-from-buying-50-4-of
-ausgrid-islgmaue; see also China Protests Aust Decision on Ausgrid,
NEWS.COM.AU (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.news.com.au/worldlbreaking-news
/china-protests-aust-decision-on-ausgrid/news-story
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that the purchase would be contrary to the national interest of
Australia.46
The above examples relate to foreign non-SWF investors.4 7 One
might speculate that acquisitions by SWFs-or at least certain
proposed acquisitions by SWFs, especially if they are for majority
stakes-could be viewed with even greater caution by national
screening authorities through the lens of national interest and
national security considerations.48
Notably, at least some treaty negotiators have manifested their
caution against challenges based on investment review decisions.49
Wary of being challenged by a party that may be disgruntled by a
refusal of investment approval or by a divestment order, preemptive
provisions against such challenges in investment treaty provisions
are emerging. 50 The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
("CETA") signed by Canada and the EU, for instance, contains
investment dispute settlement provisions for investors in chapter 8
(section F), but annex 8-C, titled "Exclusion from Dispute
Settlement," specifically provides as follows:
A decision by Canada following a review under the Investment
Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28 (1st Supp.), regarding whether
or not to permit an investment that is subject to review, is not
subject to the dispute settlement provisions under Section F, or
to Chapter Twenty-Nine (Dispute Settlement). For greater
certainty, this exclusion is without prejudice to the right of a
Party to have recourse to Chapter Twenty-Nine (Dispute
Settlement) with respect to the consistency of a measure with a
/0bc64226730776036245ad907e24df60; Andrew White & Matt Chambers,
Chinese Firm Defends FIRB Approval Process in Wake of Ausgrid Decision,
AUSTRALIAN (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs
/foreign-affairs/chinese-firm-defends-firb-approval-process-in-wake-of-ausgrid
-decision/news-story/9e2cf793c20d7dd37b46a90a7bd57d0f.
46. Media Release, Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Austl., Statement on
Decision to Prohibit the 99-Year Lease of 50.4 Per Cent of Ausgrid Under Current
Proposed Structure (Aug. 19, 2016), http://sjm.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media
-release/069-2016/; see also Ying Staton, Taking the 'Chinese' Out of Chinese
Investment in Australia, STRAITS TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017),
http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/taking-the-chinese-out-of-chinese
-investment-in-australia (providing other examples of recent Chinese investment
activity in Australia).
47. See supra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
48. Geoff Wade, China's 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative, in PARLIAMENT OF
AUSTL., BRIEFING BOOK: KEY ISSUES FOR THE 45TH PARLIAMENT 148 (2016) (noting
that Australia appears to be adopting a cautious approach with respect to the
Belt and Road Initiative); Primrose Riordan, China Snubbed on Road and Port
Push, AUSTRALIAN (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national
-affairs/foreign-affairs/china-snubbed-on-road-and-port-push/news-story
/1534e4f7de0ab0031818854d24ae0a91.
49. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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Party's reservations, as set out in the Party's Schedule to
Annexes I, II or III, as appropriate.5 1
This thinking had evidently been embraced by other countries
that have foreign investment review laws and procedures.5 2 Under
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement ("TPP"), which has not
entered into force, Australia, Canada, Mexico, and New Zealand
would enjoy an exclusion of investment review decisions under the
Investment Canada Act from investor-state (and state-to-state)
dispute settlement.5 3
Notably, an example of provisions explicitly applicable to SWFs
in a recent FTA can be found in the TPP. Under annex 17-E,
Singapore is subject to certain obligations vis-a-vis its SWFs and
enjoys certain exclusions from the Investment chapter (chapter 17) of
which the annex forms a part.54
A related and relatively under-explored issue is the extent to
which BIT/FTA exceptions on "essential security," "national security,"
and "public order" may be successfully raised by host/recipient States
in complaints raised by SWFs and SOEs. 55
51. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement annex 8-C, Can.-
European Union (treaty not unsigned), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in
-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/ (Annex is to be read with article 8.45 in the
Investment chapter); see also EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA), EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus
/ceta/ (last updated Oct. 11, 2017) (showing that CETA has received the approval
of the European Parliament but remains subject to the approval of EU member
parliaments). See generally Kevin Ackhurst et al., CETA, the Investment Canada
Act and SOEs: A Brave New World for Free Trade, 31 ICSID REV. 58 (2016).
52. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
53. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement annex 9-H, Feb. 4, 2016
[hereinafter TPP], https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements
/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text; see also Presidential Memorandum
Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Negotiations (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 2017
/01/23/presidential-memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-united-states-trans
-pacific (directing the U.S. Trade Representative to withdraw the United States
as a signatory of the TPP, to "permanently withdraw" the United States from the
TPP negotiations, and "to begin pursuing, wherever possible," bilateral
negotiations instead). See generally Julien Chaisse, Assessing the Relevance of
Multilateral Trade Law to Sovereign Investments: Sovereign Wealth Funds as
"Investors" Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 2015 INT'L REV. L.
1 (2015) (focusing mainly on the services aspect).
54. TPP, supra note 53, at annex 17-E.
55. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. Co-OPERATION & DEV., SECURITY-RELATED
TERMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND IN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES
6-7 (2009); Markus Burgstaller, Sovereign Wealth Funds and International
Investment Law, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 163,
167 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011).
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C. Treatment of Investments
The second aspect relates to treatment of a SWF investor as
measured by the commitments made in such treaties. This would
likely see the SWF as a claimant in international arbitration against
the host/recipient state.56 This may also entail court proceedings in
support of arbitration. 57
In a variant situation, when a recent dispute arose between a
Barbados entity-Blue Bank-and Venezuela, the arbitral tribunal
declined to hear the complaint for want of jurisdiction, finding that
Blue Bank, which was the trustee of the Qatar International
Authorised Purpose Trust (that held certain assets in Barbados), was
not entitled to bring a claim under the Barbados-Qatar BIT.58 The
tribunal found that Blue Bank did not own assets in the trust and
that it had not made investments under the BIT on its own behalf.59
SWFs are also potential litigants and claimants under investment
contracts that are signed with recipient states.60 In a dispute relating
to an investment made during the 2007-2008 financial crisis fueled
by the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, two arbitrations were
commenced by the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority ("ADIA") against
Citigroup, Inc. (the first in 2009 and the second in 2013).61 Citigroup
and the ADIA were parties to an investment agreement under which
ADIA invested $7.5 billion in Citigroup for a 4.9% stake, a "capital
infusion" to help rebuild in the 2007 credit crisis.6 2 The investment
agreement contained an arbitration clause providing that disputes
arising out of or relating to the agreement or its breach would be
decided through arbitration administered by the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA").63 The ADIA initiated its first
arbitration against Citigroup in 2009 under this clause based on a
number of claims. 64 The arbitral award of 2011 found in favor of
56. Sonia Yeashou Chen, Positioning Sovereign Wealth Funds as Claimants
in Investor-State Arbitration, 6 CONTEMP. AsIA ARB. J. 299, 299 (2013); see
Burgstaller, supra note 55, at 176-77; Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, States as
Foreign Investors: Diplomatic Disputes and Legal Fictions, 31 ICSID REv. 12, 17-
18 (2016).
57. See infra notes 59-80 and accompanying text.
58. Blue Bank Int'l & Tr. (Barb.) Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID
Case No. ARB/12/20, Award, ¶ 198 (Apr. 26, 2017).
59. Id. ¶T 165, 173, 198 (the arguments raised a separate issue of
Venezuela's denunciation of the BIT and its effects; on this matter, the President
of the Tribunal issued a separate and concurring opinion).
60. See infra notes 62-80 and accompanying text.
61. Citigroup, Inc. v. Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth., 776 F.3d 126, 134 (2d Cir. 2015).
62. See Robin Sidel, Abu Dhabi to Bolster Citigroup with $7.5 Billion Capital
Infusion, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27, 2007), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB119613039399104832; Press Release, Citigroup, Inc., Citi to Sell $7.5 Billion
of Equity Units to the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (Nov. 26, 2007),
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/news/2007/071126j.htm.
63. 776 F.3d at 127.
64. Id.
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Citigroup, rejecting ADIA's claims. 65 Citigroup brought an action in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York for entry of an order confirming the award and prevailed. 66
ADIA appealed.67 In 2013, while this confirmation ruling was
pending, the ADIA initiated a second arbitration against Citigroup
under the rules of the International Centre for Dispute Resolution
("ICDR") of the AAA. 68 Citigroup resisted by seeking relief under the
Federal Arbitration Act. The District Court granted Citigroup's
motions and rejected the request to enjoin the second arbitration. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this ruling. 69
With regard to the award from the first arbitration, the Court of
Appeals also affirmed. 70 The Supreme Court declined a petition for
certiorari to review the 2011 arbitral ruling.71 The second arbitration
proceeded and, in an decision issued on December 2016, Citigroup
prevailed. 72
The growth in BITs and FTAs with investment obligations
increases the scope of potential coverage of SWF investments under
such instruments and concomitantly increase the potential for claims
by such entities under them. 73 While this author is not aware of an
investor claim having been brought by a SWF under such a treaty yet,
there have been instances of claims by government-owned investors
(albeit not SWFs) against host states. An example is the claim in
Vattenfall v. Germany JI.74 The claim was brought in international
investment arbitration by Vattenfall, an entity owned by the Swedish
Government, against Germany with respect to the decision by
Chancellor Angela Merkel's government to phase out nuclear power
plants in Germany after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear plant
meltdown, which followed the earthquake and tsunami and
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth. v. Citigroup, Inc., 557 F. App'x 66, 68 (2d Cir 2014).
70. 776 F.3d at 134; see Court Upholds Citigroup Arbitration Win over Abu
Dhabi Fund, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us
-citigroup-abudhabi-idUSBREA1I1ND20140219; Nate Raymond, Citigroup
Loses Appeal over Abu Dhabi Fund's Arbitration, REUTERS (Jan. 14, 2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-citigroup
-abudhabiidUSKBN0KN1U520150114.
71. Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth. v. Citigroup, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 137 (2014) (denying
cert.).
72. Nate Raymond, Abu Dhabi Fund Loses Crisis-Related Arbitration
Against Citigroup, REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article
/citigroup-lawsuit-idUSL2N1H521L.
73. See Mark Feldman, State-Owned Enterprises as Claimants in
International Investment Arbitration, 31 ICSID-FOR. INv. L.J. 24, 32-33 (2016)
(discussing SWFs as potential claimants in investment arbitration).
74. Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Ger., ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12
(2012).
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devastated the Japanese coastal area. 75 Two arbitration actions were
brought by Vattenfall; the first resulted in a settlement agreement in
2011.76 A second arbitration remains pending at the time of writing.77
By way of further illustration of other SWF disputed activity:
* In 2016, the Libyan Investment Authority took action against
Goldman Sachs and Soci6t6 G6n6rale. The latter dispute was
settled in May 2017, while the former remains pending. 78
* In March 2017, ADIA commenced unrelated actions against
PetroBras and Petrobras Global Finance, B.V.79
* In March 2017, the Malaysian SWF 1MDB settled a dispute
with Abu Dhabi's International Petroleum Fund.80
75. Id. See generally CHRISTOPHER HUBBARD, FUKUSHIMA AND BEYOND:
NUCLEAR POWER IN A LOw-CARBON WORLD (2014) (discussing the equipment
failures at Japan's Fukushima 1 Nuclear Power Plant and the challenges of the
nuclear power option).
76. Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Ger., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6
(2009).
77. Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Ger., ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12
(2012).
78. See Kit Chellel & Matthew Campbell, Goldman Sachs Wins Suit Over
$1.2 Billion Libyan Fund Losses, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 14, 2016, 9:07 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-14/goldman-sachs-wins-libya
-investment-fund-s-1-2-billion-lawsuit; Michael Stothard & Jane Croft, SocGen
Agrees C963m Settlement with Libyan Investment Authority, FIN. TIMES (May 4,
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/7dc88450-3094-11e7-9555-23ef563ecf9a
(explaining the settlement of the Soci6t6 G6n6rale dispute). In the Goldman
Sachs dispute, the Libyan Investment Authority has sought leave to appeal from
the U.K. Court of Appeal against a judgment handed down in October 2016,
dismissing the Authority's action. See Libyan Sovereign Wealth Fund Seeks
Leave to Appeal in Goldman Dispute, REUTERS (Nov. 4, 2016, 6:50 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/libya-swf-litigation-idUSL8N1D52XW. Other
actions brought by SWFs or their representatives include actions by the Rhas Al
Khaimah Investment Authority against Farhad Azima and by the Japan
Government Pension Investment Fund (through Japan Trustee Services Bank,
Ltd.) against Toshiba. See Eleanor Warnock, Japan Government Pension Fund
Sues Toshiba Over Accounting Scandal, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2016, 4:00 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-government-pension-fund-sues-toshiba-over
-accounting-scandal- 1466654104.
79. See Abu Dhabi Investment Authority v. Petroleo Brasilerio S.A. - Petrobas
et al, PACERMONITOR, https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/20843542/Abu
_Dhabi InvestmentAuthority_v_Petroleo_BrasileiroSA__Petrobras-et-al#
(last visited Nov. 9, 2017); ADIA Sues Petrobas Thanks to Operation Car Wash
Results, SWFI (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www.swfinstitute.org/swf-news/adia-sues
-petrobras-thanks-to
-operation-car-wash-results/.
80. Malaysia and Abu Dhabi Settle IMDB Dispute with US$1.2 Billion Deal,
STRAITS TIMES (Apr. 24, 2017, 5:40 PM), http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia
/abu-dhabi-malaysia-conditionally-agree-lmdb-debt-deal; see Feldman, supra
note 73, at 24-26 (discussing SOE claims).
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V. SWFS AS DEFENDANTS
A question that arises in relation to SWFs as defendants in
litigation is their legal status for purposes of arguments of sovereign
immunity (such as under the International Law Commission's Draft
Articles and under the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property).81 However, it is not within
the scope of this Article to discuss the full implications of this question
and the extent to which the restrictive theory of state immunity
applies in jurisdictions where SWFs may face suits.
VI. SWF INVESTMENT AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
SWFs may undertake noncommercial policy objectives.82 This
has been recognized in the Santiago Principles. 83 The expectation
under these Principles is that such objectives should be clearly
explained. 84
Principle 19 states that "[t]he SWF's investment decisions should
aim to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns in a manner
consistent with its investment policy, and based on economic and
financial grounds." 85 This is followed by Subprinciple 19.1, which
states, "[i]f investment decisions are subject to other than economic
and financial considerations, these should be clearly set out in the
investment policy and be publicly disclosed." 86
Apart from the Santiago Principles, some SWFs also invest in
accordance with principles of responsible investment, which may
relate to policies regarding the environment, corruption, and child
labor.87
The Norwegian central bank, Norges Bank, through Norges
Bank Investment Management, manages the Norwegian
Government Pension Fund Global, a SWF.88 This fund is a good
81. See Kazuhiro Nakatani, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Problems of
International Law between Possessing and Recipient States, QSCIENCE.CoM (May
14, 2015), http://www.qscience.com/doi/pdf/10.5339/irl. 2 01 5 .swf.7 .
82. See SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 7.
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 8.
86. Id.
87. The Six Principles, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV.,
https://www.unpri.org/about/the-six-principles (last visited Nov. 9, 2017). A
relatively small number of SWFs have formally participated as signatories to the
Principles for Responsible Investment, with Norway being one. Other relevant
principles which SWFs may consider include the UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights. See Mushtak Parker, Investment and Good
Governance, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Feb. 20, 2017, 10:21 AM),
https://www.nst.com.my/news/ 2 017/02/213930/investment-and-good
-governance.
88. About Us, NORGEs BANK INV. MGMT., https://www.nbim.no/en
/organisation/about-us/ (last updated July 11, 2017).
850
2017] A TRADE AND INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVE
example of a SWF that makes investment decisions based on
commercial and social factors, 89 coupled with responsible investment
principles. 90 In assessing investment decisions, three focus areas are
included in the factors considered: children's rights, climate change,
and water management. 91 The list includes a number of "ethical
exclusions" for investments into which it will simply not enter. 92 For
example, the fund's 2016 annual report states that seventy-six
companies were excluded from its investments or placed under
observation, with seventy of those being the result of a new product-
based coal criterion. 93
The following table, which is transcribed from the fund's 2016
report on responsible investment, illustrates the data and factors
taken into account in its investment decisions.94
89. See Benjamin J. Richardson, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Socially
Responsible Investing: An Emerging Public Fiduciary, 1 GLOBAL J. COMP. L. 125,
144-51 (2012) (discussing the French Pension Reserve and its investing
principles relating to the environment and other social factors).
90. See NORGEs BANK INV. MGMT., RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT: GOVERNMENT
PENSION FuND GLOBAL 14 (2016), https://www.nbim.no/contentassets
/2 c3 3 7 7d 07c5a4c4fbd442b345e7fd67/government-pension-fund-global
--- responsible-investment-2016.pdf.
91. Priority Areas of Corporate Governance: Ownership Rights, Children and
the Environment, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT. (Mar. 13, 2007), https://www.nbim.no
/en/transparency/features/20 1 1-and-older/2007/priority-areas-of-corporate
-governance-ownership-rights-children-and-the-environment/.
92. NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., GOVERNMENT PENSION FuND GLOBAL: ANNUAL
REPORT 33, 42 (2016), http://static.norges-bank.no/contentassets
/e3 ldb2c97ccb4ccc9e89199a811f5593/2016_annual-report.pdf?v=04
/06/2017121801&ft=.pdf; Observation and Exclusion of Companies, NORGEs BANK
INV. MGMT., https://www.nbim.no/en/responsibility/exclusion-of-companies/ (last
updated June 29, 2017).
93. NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., supra note 92, at 33.
94. NORGEs BANK INV. MGMT., supra note 90, at 25.
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TABLE 1: EXAMPLES OF NONFINANCIAL DATA 95
Qualitative QuantitativeTheme Information Metric
Biodiversity I/
Carbon
Climate change
Waste
Water
Child labour
Corruption
Health and safety
Human capital
Fossil fuel reserves
Green revenue
Utility plant specifics
The Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global uses company
dialogues to engage with the companies in which it invests.
9 6
Australia has SWFs that also address social issues, such as the
Future Medical Research Fund.97
A. Tools for Domestic Economic Reform
SWF investment activity and governance may also serve to
promote domestic economic reforms. 9 8 Examples include Saudi
Arabia's announcement of its National Transformation Plan in
conjunction with Saudi Aramco and the Public Investment Fund.99
The Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority is also developing
a national investment plan and policy to promote diversification of
the economy, reduce dependence on the sale of hydrocarbons by 2020
through the development of nonoil sectors, and increase private-
sector investment. 100
95. Id.
96. Id. at 44-53.
97. See, e.g., Medical Research Future Fund, AUSTL. Gov'T DEP'T HEALTH,
http:/[health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/mrff (last updated
Oct. 17, 2017).
98. See, e.g., Larry CatA Backer, International Financial Institutions (IFIs)
and Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) as Instruments to Combat Corruption and
Enhance Fiscal Discipline in Developing States, QSCIENCE.COM (May 9, 2015),
http://www.qscience.com/doi/full/10.53 3 9/irl.2 015.swf.5.
99. See id.; Foreward, VISION 2030, http://vision203O.gov.sa/en/foreword (last
visited Nov. 9, 2017).
100. See Transforming Saudi Arabia: National Transformation Program
2020 Approved, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP (June 14, 2016),
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/
2 0 16/06
/Transforming-Saudi-Arabia-National-Transformation-Program-2020-Approved
-PDF-061016.pdf.
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B. SWFs as Influencer in Business Ethics
SWFs may also aspire to positively influence ethical business
practices of their suppliers. 101 SWF investment in cutting-edge
technology in disruptive businesses may also address social needs. 102
An example is the link that has been drawn between a SWF's
investment in Uber-the ride-hailing business-and the addressing
of a social need. 103 Uber, which provides chauffeured rides through
app-based consumer requests, is seen to make traveling easier for
Saudi women for whom driving is taboo. 104
C. Improving Regional Infrastructure
SWF investments can contribute greatly to infrastructure-
building.105 Where the infrastructure stands to benefit a region(rather than just one city or state) the economic and other benefits
can be multiplied many times.1 06
An example of such potential for infrastructure contribution is
the work on physical (and trade) connectivity under China's Belt and
Road initiative, which was formally launched in 2013.107 The
ambitious initiative aims to further link the Euro-Asia-Africa region
in land and sea trade connectivity, comprising a Silk Road Economic
Belt and a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.108 It is expected to
benefit from, inter alia, funds from China's SOEs and SWFs.109
Infrastructure project funding along the Belt and Road region is being
101. See, e.g., Supplier Code of Business Ethics, KHAZANAH NASIONAL,http://www.khazanah.com.my/khazanah/files/4b/4baec2bc-3365-4217-9c27
-b5eOeae5708f.pdf.
102. See, e.g., Simeon Kerr, Five Goals of Saudi Arabia's Ambitious
Transformation Plans, FIN. TIMES (June 9, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content
/cbb86ed2-2e38-11e6-a18d-a96ab29e3c95.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Wendy Wu, China's Silk Road Fund 'Seeking Investment
Projects in Europe,' SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 22, 2017, 9:27 AM),http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2081067/chinas-silk
-road-fund-seeking-investment-projects.
106. See President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to
Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries, MINISTRY
FOREIGN AFF. PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC CHINA (Sept. 7, 2013) [hereinafter President Xi
Speech], http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa-eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh
_
6 6 5686/t1076334.shtml.
107. Wu, supra note 105.
108. See President Xi Speech, supra note 106.
109. See Where Will China's 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative Lead?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Mar. 22, 2017), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu
/article/can-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative-match-the-hype/. President Xi
Jinping of China reiterated the goals of the initiative at the Belt and RoadSummit in Beijing on May 14, 2017. Xi Jinping, President, People's Republic of
China, Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century
Maritime Silk Road (May 14, 2017), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017
-05/14/c_136282982.htm.
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provided by, among others, the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank ("AIIB"), a new multilateral bank established in 2016 at China's
initiative.1 10 The AIIB can work in partnership with SWFs to help
fund the massive infrastructure needs in the region.
1
' It has an
Environmental and Social Framework which guides it in
environmental and social reviews of lending activities."
2 Apart from
the AIIB, a new Silk Road Fund has also been established.1
3
There will also be room for consideration by SWFs-both in
relation to Belt and Road initiative and otherwise-of the new
initiative on sustainability in infrastructure launched by the
Principles for Responsible Investment in February 2017."4
D. Drivers of Renewable Energy Businesses
SWFs appear to be increasingly scrutinized on their performance
with respect to markers such as management of climate-related
risks.1 15 The Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global's and New
Zealand Superannuation Fund's practice of taking into account
climate-related (and other) factors in investment decisions have
already been discussed above.116
Some SWFs have been active in investing in renewable energy
projects, acting as drivers of such business by providing infusions of
capital.1 17 As a recent example, Singapore's and Abu Dhabi's SWFs
jointly invested in Greenko Energy Holdings, Inc., in India. Greenko
Energy is a Mauritius-based entity that owns and operates renewable
energy projects (including wind, hydro, biomass, and natural gas
110. MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44754, ASIAN
INFRASTRUcTURE INVESTMENT BANK (AIIB) 1 (2017).
111. Id.
112. Environmental and Social Framework, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INV.
BANK (Feb. 2016), https://www.aiib.org/en/policies-strategies/_download
/environment-framework/20160226043633542.pdf.
113. See China to Establish $40 Billion Silk Road Infrastructure Fund,
REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2014, 5:52 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china
-diplomacy-idUSKBNOISOBQ20141108; Chinese Firms Pump $20b into Silk
Road Projects, STRAITS TIMES (June 24, 2016, 5:00 AM),
http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/chinese-firms-pump-20b-into-silk
-road-projects.
114. PRI Launches New Infrastructure Workstream, PRINCIPLES FOR
RESPONSIBLE INV. (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.unpri.org/page/pri-launches-new
-infrastructure-workstream.
115. See, e.g., Andrea Soh, Temasek, GIC 'Still Lagging in Managing Climate
Risks,' Bus. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2017), http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/companies
-markets/temasek-gic-still-lagging-in-managing-climate-risks.
116. See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., GIC Affiliate Greenko Energy Holdings to Acquire Greenko
Group PLC's Majority Interest in Greenko Mauritius, GIC (Oct. 19, 2015),
http://www.gic.com.sg/newsroom?id= 5 2 6 .
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projects) in India. 118 Finally, the Belt and Road Initiative also aims
to support sustainable development and promote cooperation
agreements on "green economy." 119
CONCLUSION
With the increasing visibility-perhaps scrutiny, as well-of the
investment activities of SWFs, their legal status, rights and
obligations under various instruments, and roles in various contexts
(legal and nonlegal) will continue to be of interest.1 20 A related issue
is the role of newer "players" in the shaping of such discussions, given
that SWFs tend to reflect economic and social priorities of their home
states. An example is the Silk Road Fund, which makes available $40
billion1 21 to finance infrastructure and other projects. It may be a
variant as it considers itself "not a [SWF]" (e.g. because it is open to
domestic and foreign investors), but, yet, "[a] major part of the Fund's
work is to make good use of China's foreign reserves." 122 Such a fund,
which would support development of important infrastructure-such
as roads, rail, ports, logistics, warehouses, and power grids-would
also support China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative whose scope
includes parts of Europe and Asia. 123 Funding the building of
increased physical, institutional, and human connectivity in the
region would no doubt go toward fulfilling not just the economic but
also the social and political objectives of the Initiative. 124 Given the
confluence of uncertain economic times resulting from national
electoral shifts on both sides of the Atlantic, the number of urgent
social objectives captured in multilateral instruments (such as the
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris
118. Arijit Barman, Greenko Energy Holdings Pegged at $1 Billion After
ADL4, GIC Arms Invest $230 Million, ECONOMIcTIMES (June 8, 2016, 2:38 AM),
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/power/greenko-energy
-holdings-pegged-at- 1-billion-after-adia-gic-arms-invest-230-million/articleshow
/52645657.cms; Ishita Russell, India: Renewable Energy Firm Greenko Raises$155m from GIC, ADL4, DEAL STREET AsIA (Mar. 28, 2017),
https://www.dealstreetasia.com/stories/india-renewable-energy-firm-greenko
-raises- 155m-from-gic-adia-68655/.
119. See President Xi Speech, supra note 106.
120. See generally Al-Hassan et al., Sovereign Wealth Funds: Aspects of
Governance Structures and Investment Management 15, 19, 21 (Int'l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. 13/231, 2013), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp
/2013/wp13231.pdf (discussing the features, objectives, and key aspects of SWFs
and their investment policies).
121. See sources cited supra note 113.
122. Purpose and Positioning, SILK ROAD FUND, http://www.silkroadfund.com
.cn/enweb/23819/23770/index.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2017).
123. See William T. Wilson, China's Huge 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative is
Sweeping Central Asia, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Nov. 21, 2016),
http://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/chinas-huge-one-belt-one-road
-initiative-sweeping-central-asia.
124. See Purpose and Positioning, supra note 122.
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Agreement) and the ongoing and impending labor displacements
arising from new technology applications, 12 5 there may arise further
new roles for SWFs in the future. 126
Finally, SWFs are complex by nature; demanding further social
responsibility of them will no doubt add to this complexity. This, in
turn, may lead to an exacerbation of domestic suspicions and levels of
approval-stage scrutiny based on national security concerns. In order
not to stymie legitimate commercial activity, national lawmakers and
implementers will need to strike a balance between caution and
economic needs, while SWFs, on the other hand, will have to
determine how to manage the perception of their investment
activities in case they are viewed as overly or inappropriately activist.
This mutual weighing will take place against a backdrop of
potentially litigious relationships between SWFs as claimants under
investment treaties and FTAs against their recipient states, as the
number of investment treaty obligations that include such entities
within their scope rises.
125. See, e.g., Ed Felton & Terah Lyons, The Administration's Report on the
Future of Artificial Intelligence, WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 6, 2016, 6:02 AM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/10/12/administrations-report
-future-artificial-intelligence.
126. See John Lipsky, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Their Role and Significance,
INT'L MONETARY FUND (Sept. 3, 2008), http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles
/2015/09/28/04/53/sp090308.
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